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Abstract: Tunisia’s 2011 revolution to an end close to five decades of authoritarian rule, and as of spring 
2017, it is the only successful post-Arab spring democracy in the MENA region. However, Tunisia is also 
the nation with the most individuals leaving to join the Islamic State, both in total numbers and per capita. 
This thesis explores Tunisia’s foreign-fighter question through Della Porta’s social movement framework, 
analysing how the nation’s history of state repression, the democratisation and socioeconomic inequalities 
contributed to the choice of many Tunisian to leave their new democracy for foreign conflicts.  
 
The Aftermath of  a Revolution 
Examining the motivations influencing Tunisia’s IS Foreign-Fighters 
Isabella Vogel  
Master Thesis  
6th June 2017 
	
1 
	 	 	
Research Question 
Why has Tunisia, the only successful post Arab-Spring democracy, produced the most 
IS foreign-fighters (as of Spring 2017)?  
Introduction  
As of December 2015, the Islamic State had attracted approximately 30,000 foreign-
fighters from around the world (Benmelech and Klor 2016, 1). Whilst western media 
extensively focused on the European nationals who had joined the Islamic State, or IS, the 
country that has seen the most foreign-fighters join IS is Tunisia. Approximately one fifth of 
IS’s foreign-fighters are Tunisian, numbering around 6,000-7,000 (The Soufan Group 2015). 
This means that 1 in every 545.5 of the 11 million Tunisians, has left the country in the 
pursuit of becoming an IS foreign-fighter (Benmelech and Klor 2016, 16, 19; The World 
Factbook 2017).In comparison, Saudi Arabians, who make up the second largest group of IS 
fighters, number around 2,500; that is 3,500 fewer than Tunisians (Benmelech and Klor 2016, 
16). Furthermore, 2011 witnessed the fall of Tunisia’s incumbent president Ben Ali and 
almost five decades of authoritarian rule (The Editors of Encylopaedia Britannica 2015). The 
subsequent democratisation of the nation is (generally) viewed as successful. There are 
debates surrounding the legitimacy of the Tunisian democracy, as this thesis is concerned, the 
American NGO Freedom House’s ranking of Tunisia as free, will be respected as a 
qualification for Tunisia to be considered a democracy1. The democratisation of Tunisia 
allowed Islamic social movements who had been silenced under the decades of authoritarian 
imposed secularism, to find a platform of expression (initially) free of surveillance  (Murphy 
																																								 																				
1 https://freedomhouse.org/country/tunisia  
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2002; Packer 2016). Radical and violent radical Islamic social movements2 used these new 
political freedoms to share their beliefs, preach freely3, and revive “old networks” 
domestically and transnationally (Balboni and Malka 2016; Packer 2016).  
Despite Tunisia’s democratisation and post-revolutionary religious freedom, the 
grievances of the 2011 revolution protest cycle have not been completely addressed. The 
country has an unemployment rate of 15%, the rate of youth unemployment is more than 
double at 35%, and perhaps most strikingly, the unemployment rate for university graduates is 
31.2% (Devarajan et al 2016, 69). In addition to the challenge unemployment has presented 
the post-revolutionary government, the country has been the target of a number of deadly acts 
of political violence. The counter-terrorism measures taken in response of these acts of 
political violence have witnessed the revival of certain pre-revolutionary counter-terrorism 
policies, including the state-control of religious institutions and reports of torture (Balboni and 
Malka 2016; Amnesty International 2017).   
  This parallel emergence of the growth of political violence and democracy in Tunisia 
poses the question whether democracy, and the freedoms that it embodies, are the cause of 
this surge in political violence and Tunisia’s foreign-fighters? Or, alternatively, whether other 
underlying socioeconomic factors need to be analysed in combination with the regime change 
to better understand the growth of Tunisian political violence, especially with regard to 
foreign-fighters. This thesis examines the question why Tunisia, the only successful post-Arab 
Spring democracy, has produced the most IS foreign-fighters (as of Spring 2017)?  
																																								 																				
2	This thesis employs the term radical social movements when discussing salafists and violent radical social 
movements when discussing jihadi-salafists. These terms are based on Della Porta’s (2013) definitions of social 
movments. 
3	New platforms for religious education were quickly established and occupied by Salafists, as state-control of 
institutions of religious education ended post-revolution (Balboni and Malka 2016).	
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The thesis employs Della Porta’s framework on political violence, presented in 
Clandestine Political Violence to examine the motivating factors behind Tunisia’s current 
wave of foreign-fighters through a multidimensional approach. Firstly, the existing literature 
on post-revolutionary Tunisia, transnational activists, democracy’s relationship with political 
violence, and the role socioeconomic inequalities play in transnational activism is examined. 
Following the literature review, Della Porta’s theoretical framework is expanded upon, and 
the methods of data generation and analysis are presented. Finally, Tunisia’s pre-
revolutionary relationship with Islam, post-revolutionary political opportunity and mobilising 
structures, and the persistence of the grievances of the 2011 revolution are discussed in order 
to examine the nation’s current foreign-fighter phenomenon.  
Literature Review 
The literature on Tunisia’s political history and mechanisms of state-control explain to 
a great extent the different post-revolutionary engagements of the Islamic social movements 
within Tunisia.  Tunisia’s authoritarian regimes, under both Bourgiba and later Ben Ali, had a 
history of repressing opposition, including “grassroots Islamic organisations”, and a vehement 
dedication (with short ruptures) to maintaining the secularism of the Tunisian state (Layachi 
2013, 353).  Some authors, such as Layachi (2013) (who focuses on the Tunisia) and Roy 
(2004) (who focuses on the West) identify the “secularization of the public space” as pivotal 
in explaining the creation of Islamic brotherhoods, particularly by moderate Islamists who 
sought a means to practise their religion separate from the authoritarian regime’s state 
controlled religious institutions (370). The role of authoritarian secularism in shaping the 
nation’s current wave of political violence is discussed by numerous scholars including 
Layachi (2013), Willis (2013), Malka (2015), and Balboni and Malka (2015). The historical 
state-repression of religious activity coupled with the state control of mosques and Islamic 
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schools led to moderate Islamists practising Islam in brotherhoods, and subsequently the 
creation of a post-revolutionary religious vacuum within Tunisia. Balboni and Malka (2015) 
identify the opportunity this religious vacuum provided radical Islamists to spread their 
messages and preaching post-revolution. Despite the authoritarian state control of religion, 
radical Islamic ideology managed to enter the Tunisian religious discourse through Tunisians 
who had been exposed to the Gulf’s Salafism after returning from the gulf states in 70’s and 
80’s, as well as the Arabisation policies of education in the 80’s which brought teachers from 
the Mashriq to Tunisia, who often brought “salafi and Islamist ideology” with them too 
(Malka 2015, 97).  These migration patterns brought radical Islamic ideologies to the policed 
secular state. Furthermore, agreeing with Bonelli’s (2015) argument that transnationalism 
activism is able to reap the benefits of new technology, Malka (2015) highlights the roles 
“satellite television and later the internet” played a large role in further providing individuals 
direct access to radical Islamic preaching from abroad (97-98). These factors created a 
division between moderate Islamic brotherhoods and radical Islamists who could engage with 
radical preaching and transnational networks on an individual bases assisted by technology. 
Post-revolutionary Tunisia provided a new opening for religious practice, and the vacuum was 
quickly filled by radical Islamic preachers and not Islamic moderates who were accustomed 
their practising within brotherhoods (Layachi 2013). The social and cultural preconditions of 
the Ben Ali regime resulted in moderate Islamists grasping the new political opportunities the 
revolution presented and playing a large role in post-revolutionary Tunisian politics, however, 
(initially) not challenging radical Islamists in their occupation of the post-revolutionary 
religious vacuum (Willis 2013, 540-541).  
Whilst the literature on post-revolutionary Tunisia assists in understanding the 
domestic context in which radical Islamic social movements grew in popularity, various 
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(primarily social movement theory) scholars highlight the need to consider the transnational 
framework of foreign-fighters.  Layachi (2013), Willis (2013), Malka (2015), and Balboni and 
Malka (2015) all highlight the links between violent radical Islamist in Tunisia and 
transnational radical Islamist networks, as well as the role technological developments have 
played in allowing transnational activists, such as Salafists organisations, to gain access to a 
wider audience in the country. However, as Malet (2010) and Tarrow (2010) argue, 
transnational activism is not a new phenomenon, and neither are foreign-fighters. Therefore it 
is important to asses Tunisian foreign-fighters in a framework that is not limited to a national 
and post-revolutionary perspective. Malet (2010) and Della Porta (2013) stress the necessity 
to look beyond the structure and analyse the agency behind foreign-fighters, as demystifying 
foreign-fighters as neither a new nor uniquely Islamic phenomenon allows the local roots, 
motivations, and societal factors that motivate transnational activists, such as Tunisia foreign-
fighters, to be taken into consideration (97). Malet (2010) extends the argument by drawing 
on historical examples of foreign-fighters to illustrate the similarities between the current 
wave of Islamic foreign-fighters and previous waves, such as during the Spanish civil war. 
Malet (2010) and Tarrow (2010) argue that the attractiveness of transnational activism lies in 
the way social movements, such as certain Tunisian radical Islamic groups, “frame their 
demands in ways that enable them to join with others, and identify common targets” (5). In 
relation to foreign-fighters, Malet (2010) stresses that recruiters frame “distant civil conflicts 
as threatening a transnational identity group with which the recruit is closely affiliated”, thus 
making the distant personal, such as the Syrian civil war for a Tunisian student (99-100). Yet, 
as Bonelli (2015) argues, each transnational activist’s commitment to an over-arching 
transnational cause should not be exaggerated. While a common desire to engage in changing 
the world is present amongst most transnational activists, yet there is also a vagueness of what 
and how this change will occur.  In relation to Tunisian foreign-fighters, Balboni and Malka’s 
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(2016) discussion of the motivations behind Tunisians leaving to take-up arms abroad 
includes the economic inequalities and failure of the democratic post-revolutionary economy 
to fulfil its promises of providing a brighter future for its youth. However, they, Layachi 
(2013), Willis (2013), and Malka (2015) focus primarily on structure over agency behind 
transnational activists in Tunisia, focusing on the domestic political structure and post-
revolutionary challenges over the framing of foreign conflict by radical Islamic social 
movements. Understanding Tunisian foreign-fighters through the framework of transnational 
activists assists in de-essentialising the current wave of foreign-fighters; however, the 
democratisation and domestic political context should not be disregarded, as Balboni and 
Malka (2016). Layachi (2013), Willis (2013), and Malka (2015) highlight.  
The correlation between the democratisation of Tunisia and the growth of violent 
radical Islamism within the nation cannot be ignored, however, various scholars argue that it 
is in democracy’s nature to prevent political violence from arising, and therefore the causes of 
political violence may lie in perceived political, social, and/or economic deprivation. Lia and 
Skjølberg (2005), Gurr (1988) and Hafez (2013) argue that it is in democracy’s nature to 
allow individuals to voice their dissent, and that therefore, individuals would not desire to 
engage in political violence. These scholars view democracies to have “greater legitimacy 
among their populations”; and as result, democracies prevent regime toppling/revolutionary 
“dissatisfaction” amongst the wider populace (Lia and Skjølberg 2005; 32).  Democracy’s 
legitimacy is also discussed by Sambanis (2008), who entitles these preventative factors 
“demand-side factors”, and draws on Crenshaw (1981), Schmid (1992) and Abide (2004) to 
argue that they in-turn result in “fewer political grievances that support terrorism in 
democracies” (196). Drawing on Engene’s study of The Patterns of Terrorism in Western 
Europe, 1950-1995, Lia and Skjølberg (2005) argue that terrorism is “systematically related 
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to low measures of freedom and democracy” (32). Hafez (2013) builds on this argument to 
explain terrorism in the MENA region, and, in a similar vein to Layachi (2013), Willis (2013), 
Malka (2015), and Balboni and Malka (2015), blames the region’s authoritarian regimes for 
terrorism, as they may have been successful at imprisoning suspected terrorist domestically. 
However, the export of “radical ideologies” could not be stopped, and “extremism” was not 
marginalised (149). However, Hafez (2013) argues that democratisation will curtail terrorism 
on the long-run in the MENA region. In addition to the freedom to voice dissent within a 
democracy, Gurr (1988) identifies a lack of sympathy for terrorist and political violence 
within democracies as a deterrent of terrorism within a democracy.  However, Gurr’s (1971) 
relative deprivation theory finds that the presences of widespread dissatisfaction amongst a 
population, particularly in relation to a “perceived discrepancy between [individuals] value 
expectations and their value capabilities”, results in relative deprivation that can foster 
political violence within a democracy (18). This theory is not without critique, Tilly (1971) 
argues it is flawed because it cannot be faulted, as political violence can nearly never occur 
without a sense of relative deprivation, the exception being “impulsive acts of political 
violence” (417).  However, flaws aside, if relative deprivation is taken into account, 
socioeconomic inequality within a democracy can be identified as a motivation for individuals 
to engage in political violence, and therefore the correlation between Tunisia’s 
democratisation and political violence may be understood through the frame of 
socioeconomic inequalities. 
Taking socioeconomic inequality into account in answering the foreign-fighter 
question contributes to understanding one possible agency behind foreign-fighters, however, 
various scholars argue, generalisations lead to individual motivations of foreign-fighters being 
overlooked. Malet (2010) argues that a lower socioeconomic background can be a motivating 
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factor for an individual to engage in transnational political violence, isolating “men who are in 
their early 20s” “from lower socioeconomic status backgrounds” as the stereotypical foreign 
fighter strata (113). Bonelli (2015) is in disagreement with the argument that transnational 
activists come from a particular strata of society, and stresses the variety of backgrounds 
transnational activists possess. Llussa and Tavares (2008) share Bonelli’s opinion and 
disagree with Malet (2010), favouring Krueger and Maleckova (2003), Berrebi (2003) and 
Schelling’s (1991) arguments that “terrorist acts” are “not associated with “lower education or 
economic status” (Llussa and Tavares 2008, 238). Krueger and Laitin (2008) extend their 
argument to highlight that repression influences terrorism to a greater degree than poverty, 
arguing that “terrorist perpetrators are not necessarily the poor. But those who are repressed 
politically tend to terrorize the rich” (172). These approaches look beyond structure and take 
the agency of political violence into account.  Sambanis (2008) echoes this belief, and draws 
on Della Porta (1995) and Tarrow (1998) to argue that the “indiscriminate use of state 
repression in response to terrorism serves to mobilize the masses including moderates who 
would not otherwise support the terrorists” (200). Yet, generalising the motivations behind 
terrorism and support for political violence is dangerous, as Tilly (1971) and Della Porta 
(2013) note, as understanding the signals/the point terrorists are attempting to make is vital to 
understanding the goals and results political violent activists are searching for, and what their 
motivations may be.   This point returns to Gurr’s argument that it is not necessarily the poor 
that take-up political violence, but members of society that feel they are being treated 
unfairly, as they are not able to obtain the economic opportunities they deserve. Therefore, 
stereo-typing socioeconomic stratum may be counterproductive as it leads to generalisations 
and does not consider the variety of individual motivations in becoming a foreign-fighter.  
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The literature on Tunisia’s post-revolutionary socio-political developments, 
transnational activists, democracy’s relation to political violence, and the socioeconomic 
agency of foreign-fighters highlight that the question of foreign-fighters cannot be understood 
from a unidimensional perspective, as both the structure and the agency of foreign-fighters 
need to be taken into consideration. The literature on transnational activists’ highlights the 
need to de-essentialise the current Tunisian foreign-fighter wave, and stresses the need to 
analyse the domestic context and the framing of foreign conflict by social movements. The 
correlation between the democratisation of the nation and the rise of foreign-fighters 
highlights the need to consider the motivations of foreign-fighters, including relative 
deprivation. However, as the literature on the socioeconomic agency of foreign-fighters 
indicates, it is important not to succumb to simply correlating socioeconomic background and 
political violence.  Whilst there is a variety of literature that focuses on the post-revolutionary 
political structure in Tunisia, there is a gap in the literature in relation to analysing political 
violence in Tunisia through a multidimensional approach that allows the transnational 
characteristics of the current wave of political violence to be understood alongside the 
domestic socio-political context. The following section will describe the theoretical 
framework this thesis’ multidimensional analysis of the foreign-fighter question.  
Theoretical Framework  
Della Porta (2013) approaches political violence through a framework that allows 
multiple factors including democracy, but also repression and perceived socioeconomic 
inequalities to be considered in the schema of interactions that can lead to political violence. 
She approaches political violence through a social movement approach, taking into 
consideration the ‘mechanism’ and the relational, constructivist and emergent characteristics 
of political violence (24). Della Porta (2013) defines ‘mechanisms’ to be “chains of 
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interactions that filter structural conditions and produce effects”, therefore, political violence 
is not considered to be an isolated occurrence but part of a continuum of interactions (44). 
Viewing political violence through relational, constructivist and emergent characteristics 
allows for the  “the interactions between various actors, both institutional and non-
institutional”, “experiential reality” of the actors, and the “casual mechanisms” of the public, 
group and individual experiences of the actors to be understood (Della Porta 2013, 24). In 
other words, Della Porta provides a framework through which political violence is analysed 
by assessing multiple factors, instead of singling out one causal factor. Della Porta (2013) 
employs the “classical social movement agenda”, which allows for the interactions between 
the “political opportunity structures”, “mobilizing structures”, “framing” and “repertoires” 
behind a social movement to understood, and how a social movement’s interactions with 
“their opponents” can make them turn to political violence (33-34). Or in other words, what 
political, socioeconomic and environmental factors can push a group to embrace political 
violence, including repressive measures adopted by the state against social movements, or 
“escalated policing” (Della Porta 2013, 45).   
Employing Della Porta’s framework to analyse political violence is beneficial in the 
case of Tunisian foreign-fighters as it allows democracy’s influence on the growth of foreign-
fighters to be analysed. Additionally, as highlighted above, Della Porta’s framework allows 
for a multiple dimensional understanding of the interactions behind political violence. 
Therefore, Tunisia’s relationship with escalated policing, in particular the authoritarian state’s 
repression of Islam and the post-revolutionary opportunities for repressed groups to express 
their beliefs publically; as well as mobilizing structures, particularly related to the 
socioeconomic inequalities of post-revolutionary Tunisia can be assessed in relation to the 
growth of political violence. This approach allows for political violence in Tunisia to be 
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analysed through a public level, focusing on the public’s perception of the post-revolutionary 
political changes and radical Islam, on a group level by focusing on the interactions between 
the government and radical Islamists groups, and on an individual level by focusing on the 
potential motivating factors influencing Tunisia’s foreign-fighters, such as socioeconomic 
inequalities. By employing this approach, the mechanisms that have instigated the growth of 
Tunisian foreign-fighters can be better understood, instead of focusing on a single causal-
factor. Furthermore, Della Porta’s social movements approach allows for the Tunisian 
foreign-fighter phenomenon to be viewed through what Wiktorowicz (2004) argues is a 
neutral perspective that prevents essentialising the Islamic element. This approach will be 
utilised to discuss Tunisia’s violent radical Islamists, not as being uniquely Islamic, but as 
politically violent social activists.  
Arguments   
In order to understand Tunisia’s foreign-fighter phenomenon beyond the question of 
democracy:  
a. The pre-revolutionary relationship of state-repression and Islam, and the post-
revolutionary political opportunity structures need to be considered.   
b. The post-revolutionary mobilizing structures, and the persistence of 
socioeconomic inequalities need to be considered.   
Operationalisation   
For this thesis, state-repression is a key concept that is operationalised through 
assessing the post-revolutionary freedoms, particularly freedom of religious expression, press 
freedom, and the freedom of movement, which were pursued by many who had been silenced 
under the authoritarian regime (Balboni and Malka 2016). Tunisia’s democratisation is bound 
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to its authoritarian past, as the present political violence cannot be understood without 
reflecting on the nation’s historical relationship with authoritarianism and state-repression. 
The second concept that is related to state-repression, and deserves its own operationalisation 
is political opportunity structure. The political opportunity structures occur when a political 
system is vulnerable and new opportunities arise. The operationalisation of this concept is 
based on Della Porta’s framework, which considers dimensions related to the political context 
including “environmental responses, the reactions of authorities, and the strength and postures 
of potential allies and opponents”, as well as the division and territorial centralisation of 
power (McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1989; Tilly 1978 quoted in Della Porta 2013, 36-38). 
The concept of mobilising structures also draws on Della Porta’s framework, and is 
operationalised through considering social movement’s physical occupation of religious and 
educational institutions, popularity in terms of public attendance to speeches, connection to 
transnational militant networks, and guiding ideology that provides an alternative to the state. 
These mobilizing structures can be further assessed in relation to the concept of 
socioeconomic inequalities of the nation, as these are indicative of both the resentment 
towards the government as well as the appeal of transnational political violence to individuals 
who feel disadvantaged by their experiential reality (Packer 2016; Gurr 1988). The concept of 
socioeconomic inequalities in Tunisia is operationalised through the dimensions of income 
inequality, cost of corruption to the country, the average education level, job opportunities 
and the unemployment level of both the nation and different age groups, as Malet (2010) 
stresses that younger adults are more likely to engage in transnational political violence. 
 
Methods of Data Generation and Methods of Data Analysis 
This thesis was based on qualitative research that was approached through contextual 
discourse analysis (Ruiz Ruiz 2009). The understanding of discourse was drawn from Ruiz 
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Ruiz’s (2009) definition that recognizes discourse to be “any practice by which individuals 
imbue reality with meaning” (2). The data generated for this thesis consisted of a combination 
of primary and secondary sources. The primary sources included semi-structured interviews, 
based on lose guiding questions, with experts from the fields of counter-terrorism, law, and 
non-governmental organisations. The interviews were intended to gain a deeper and current 
perspective on Tunisian foreign-fighters, and to investigate how the current government 
frames foreign-fighters. The interviews also focused on the consequences new counter-
terrorism measures have had on freedoms within the nation, in particular in relation to Islam. 
After transcription, contextual discourse analysis was employed to analyse the interviews, as 
it allowed for the analysis to “centre on the enunciation, considering the discourse as a 
singular act” (Ruiz Ruiz 2009, 3). Additionally, primary sources on Tunisia’s economy from 
leading global databanks, such as the UN and the World Bank on GDP and income inequality 
were analysed through textual analysis. “Description” was employed to translate “these non-
textual discourses” to a textual from, so as to focus on “the utterance and consider the 
discourse as an object of study” (Ruiz Ruiz 2009, 3-4).  
The secondary sources included Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International 
Reports on Tunisia, and other reports such as from the Carnegie Middle East Centre and the 
Small Arms Survey on Tunisian foreign-fighters. The reports were chosen based on the 
reputation of the organisations that published them and their relevance to the research 
question. These sources were used to draw a comparison between pre- and post-revolutionary 
Tunisia, in order to highlight the changes that have occurred and draw parallels where 
necessary. Textual analysis was principally employed when analysing the secondary sources. 
In an attempt to better understand the flow of foreign-fighters out of Tunisia, this thesis used 
data from the Soufan Group, a leading non-governmental intelligence agency, as a secondary 
source to identify how many Tunisians have left the country, and what the patterns of 
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departure have been. Additionally, the Carnegie Centre for Strategic and International 
Studies’ data on the routes taken by Tunisian foreign-fighters and the numbers returning were 
also analysed. Again these sources were looked at through a textual approach.  
Scope and Limits 
 This thesis contributed to the current literature on Tunisian foreign-fighters by 
employing Della Porta’s social movement framework. This approach was employed in order 
to advance the understanding of the motivating factors behind the MENA region’s foreign-
fighters, as well as address the lack of focus on transitional democracies in social movement 
studies4. This thesis was limited by its lack of Arabic sources and the author’s inability to 
travel to Tunisia to conduct interviews. Therefore, it is possible that the findings of this thesis 
are contradicted by existent Arabic sources. Furthermore, the author was not able to conduct 
personal interviews with Tunisian foreign-fighters, therefore, this thesis was limited to 
focusing primarily on the macro and meso levels of Della Porta’s (2013) analysis, over the 
micro-individual level.	
The Authoritarian Regime’s State-Repression and Islam 
The growth and popularity of Islamic social movements in post-revolutionary Tunisia 
are to a great part explained by the relational characteristics of the authoritarian regime’s 
policies of (almost) continuous state-repression. The authoritarian regime’s interactions with 
Islamic social movements (radical and moderate) consisted (mainly) of acts of repression as 
Tunisia’s first post-Independence president, Bourgiba’s secularist political ideology persisted 
until 2011. The authoritarian regime framed Islamic social movements as oppositional as they 
expressed concern about the country’s “secular drift”, and discussed the socio-economic 
																																								 																				
4	As highlighted by Della Porta (2013).  
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inequality that were fostered by the authoritarian regime’s embedded corruption (Murphy 
2002, 237; Willis 2013, 532). The authoritarian regime5 responded with state-repression and 
religious policing in an attempt to curtail the growth of oppositional movements. The sole 
exceptions to the state’s policing of opposition and religion were instances in which the 
regime believed it could be to its own benefit to allow these social movements to prosper, 
resulting in a form of state-controlled competitive escalation6. The transition of power from 
Bourgiba to Ben Ali witnessed a brief change, from repression to acceptance, in the 
interactions between the authoritarian regime and Tunisia’s most-prominent Islamic social 
movement and political party, Ennahda. This was considered an attempt by Ben Ali to cement 
his political legitimacy and included the release of political prisoners and relatively free 
elections (Willis 2013, 532). However, in a similar vein to his predecessor, Ben Ali’s 
toleration for political openness and opposition changed once his regime’s hegemony was 
challenged by Ennahda’s electoral success in 1989. Ennahda’s roots as an Islamic social 
movement, and the platform it and other Islamic social movements provided repressed 
individuals to express their socioeconomic grievance, resulted in Ben Ali’s regime returning 
to the previous authoritarian regime’s repertoires of action. These actions resulted in the 
repression and imprisonment of opposition from 1991 onwards (Willis 2013, 533).These acts 
of state-repression framed Islamic social movements as oppositional, but also resulted in them 
gaining socio-political legitimacy as they were willing to raise the concerns of the people in 
public and challenge the authoritarian regime.  
																																								 																				
5Tunisia’s authoritarian regime only allowed political parties to compete from 1981 onwards, yet it continued to 
police their policies and limited their ability to freely compete in politics (Willis 2013, 533).  
6	Two principle examples being Bourgiba’s toleration of and alleged support of the growth of grassroots Islamic 
social movements in universities in the 1970’s as a means to challenge the threat of leftists social movements, 
and Ben Ali’s initial toleration of Ennahda6 in the 1980s (Willis 2013, 532).	
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Ben Ali’s escalated religious policing policies from 1991 onwards, banning “almost 
all forms of religious expression” are one of the principal causes of the post-revolutionary 
religious vacuum (Grami 2014, 392-395). During the 1990’s, “thousands of political 
Islamists”, including “salafists and jihadi-salfists” were arrested with “little distinction” being 
made as to their motives (Balboni and Malka 2016). This cycle of escalated policing 
continued throughout Ben Ali’s regime. The Anti-Terrorism Act of  2003 “essentially  
criminalized” the practice of Islam, and thus framed engaging actively in Islamic practises an 
act of terrorism (Delegation of Attorneys from National Lawyers Guild (US), Haldane Society 
of Socialist Lawyers (UK) and Maziumder 2011, 132). Ben Ali’s repression and 
imprisonment of Islamists turned prisons into mobilisation structures as they became a space 
where “jihadi ideologies” could be preached and new members recruited (Colombo 2016, 
108)7. The regime’s escalated policing policies went so far as to indirectly support the 
activation of militant networks by encouraging certain “jihadi-Salafists” “to leave the country, 
including to join al Qaeda–linked groups fighting in Iraq, where the government assumed they 
would likely die on the battlefield and not return” (Balboni  and Malka 2016). The continued 
use of authoritarian policies of state-repression and policing of religion resulted in Tunisian 
society being limited in its public forms of Islamic practise. As the population was majority 
Muslim, the state’s escalated policing policies caused religious practises to undergo a shift 
away from the public sphere to private, with individuals engaging in brotherhoods to practise 
and discuss Islam8 outside of the state’s sphere of control. Individuals outside of brotherhoods 
did not have the same access to these mobilising structures, and were limited to the state’s 
policed version of the religion, and therefore could not discuss and debate religion freely 
																																								 																				
7 Colombo draws on an interview in eights issue of the magazine Dabiq with Abu Muqatil al-Tunisi who is 
quoted stating that new recruiters were found through preaching in Tunisian prisons.  
8	See literature review 	
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without fearing to be labelled a terrorist. Thus, in 2011, when Ben Ali was ousted, the state’s 
control of religious practise was also toppled, giving rise to new political opportunity and 
mobilising structures. The institutionalisation of the state-control of Islam resulted in a 
religious vacuum being created post-revolution, with individuals eager to embrace the new 
freedom of religious expression, and radical Islamic social movement’s eager to use this 
political opportunity to engage with a wider audience and establish mobilising structures 
(Balboni and Malka 2016).  
The Grievances of the Revolution’s Protests  
The grievances of the 2011 revolution’s protest cycle explain in great part the 
socioeconomic experiential reality of Tunisians under the authoritarian regime, beyond 
religious oppression, and the emergent character of Tunisia’s post-revolutionary political 
challenges. Mohammed Bouazizi’s self-immolation was illustrative of the widespread 
sentiment of socioeconomic inequality and political injustice. He was a poor street-vendor 
who self-immolated in reaction to the corrupt justice system. He became a martyr for the 
revolution, symbolising the regime’s disrespect for justice, and motivating the oppressed to 
challenge the incumbent political power structure9.   The revolution was framed to have 
“defeated a regime that was characterised by corruption, secrecy and authoritarian rule” 
(OECD 2016, 3). The authoritarian regimes explicit structures of hierarchy and its territorial 
centralisation were significant causes of the grievances of the 2011 protest cycle. The 
authoritarian regime’s corruption was composed of explicit structures of hierarchy, and 
interactions between Tunisian citizens and security forces (including the police) were 
characterized by intimidation and bribery (International Crisis Group 2013, 13). The territorial 
																																								 																				
9 Della Porta (2013) identifies that “[e]motionally charged events – such as the deaths of comrades at the hands 
of the police – also favour radicalization, through processes of identification” (92). 
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centralisation of political and economic power in the coastal cities10 further resulted in 
fostering sentiments of injustice in the country’s border regions, which compose a majority of 
the nation’s interior regions. Whilst education was widespread in Tunisia, as it was one of 
Bourgiba’s main undertakings, there continued to be discrepancies between the educational 
system of the interior and coastal regions (Boughzala and Hamdi 2014, 1; The World Bank 
2014, 285). This factor in addition to the interior’s “rampant informal economy, high 
unemployment, corruption and an underdeveloped private sector” were the principal causes 
that constructed a reality of limited opportunity and socioeconomic repression (Meddeb 2017, 
1). As far as job opportunities were concerned in the interior region, “little [had been] done to 
develop non-agricultural economic activities” and “clientelist networks and security forces 
controlled the job market, social benefits, and the informal economy through protection from 
law enforcement” (Boughzala and Hamdi 2014, 1; Meddeb 2017, 4). Whilst the 
socioeconomic injustices were more severely felt in the interior regions, they were not limited 
to these areas. The combination of political repression and socioeconomic inequality resulted 
in the protest cycles of the revolution not only belonging to the religiously repressed or the 
poor, but as the relative deprivation theory explains, to those who believed they were 
disadvantaged by the authoritarian regime’s corruption and repression and believed they were 
entitled social, political, and/or economic conditions. The consequences of protesting were 
severe, even deadly in many cases, however, police killings of protesters reinforced the 
sentiments of injustice (Legal Scholar 2017). The revolution was not supported solely by 
Tunisians with democratic leanings; it was supported by the interior and the coastal regions, 
																																								 																				
10	Tunisia’s economy was largely dependent on coastal tourism, and the rural areas provided a source for “cheap 
labour” (Meddeb 2017, 2). “Approximately 56% of [Tunisia’s] population and 92% of all industrial firms are 
located within an hour’s drive of Tunisia’s three largest cities: Tunis, Sfax and Sousse”, all close to the coast 
(Meddeb 2017, 2)	
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leftist, Islamists, and radical Islamic extremists alike11 (Delegation of Attorneys from National 
Lawyers Guild (US) et al 2011, 130). The individual’s motivation to protests varied 
depending on their personal social surroundings, yet, a (temporary) collective identity in 
opposition to the regime was forged. However, as Della Porta (2013) identifies, “social 
transformations” “exacerbate political conflicts”, especially when new actors, in this case 
being the post-revolutionary social movements, begin to compete and challenge incumbent 
actors, the authoritarian regime (36-37). 
The Post-Revolutionary Political Opportunity Structure  
The post-revolutionary political opportunity structure’s initial departure from the 
authoritarian policies of state-repression explain in a great part how previously clandestine 
radical Islamic social movements became publically engaged. The authoritarian regime was 
characterized by its state-repression, and the Tunisians who took part in the revolution desired 
an end to “the arrest[s], torture, and imprisonment” by the authoritarian regime (Delegation of 
Attorneys from National Lawyers Guild (US) et al 2011, 132). The first interim government 
was led by Ennahda, whose own history of political oppression and Islamic ideology had 
traditionally fostered a voter base that was neither of a particular class nor occupation, 
principally located in the large cities (Willis 2013, 537).  These factors contributed to 
Ennahda’s post-revolutionary popularity and it grasped the opportunity to head Tunisia’s 
interim government. The post-revolutionary government was tasked with the duty of 
distancing itself and the country’s political system from the remnants of the Ben Ali’s regime. 
The right to freedom of speech and religion were enacted, and state-control of religious 
institutions ended. The results of this “new political openness” was a burst in organisations 
																																								 																				
11 In Fabio Merone’s interview with a member of Ansar al-Sharia, the individual states that the revolution 
provided him with an opportunity to express his belief and along with fellow jihadist take part in the revolution. 
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/11166/salafism-in-tunisia_an-interview-with-a-member-of-  
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representing all spectrums of Tunisian society, “7,000-10,000 organisations”, and more than 
“100 political” parties were registered, illustrative of the “ideological and political 
kaleidoscope” that was present in the nation (Balboni and Malka 2016). To symbolise the 
interim government’s opposition to the tactics of the authoritarian regime, it enacted a general 
amnesty law that pardoned political prisoners “imprisoned under Ben Ali”, including radical 
Islamists. The diversity in opinion on Tunisia’s future was extended to the legal arena, where 
opposing pillars of Tunisian society clashed as to what role Islam should play in their new 
democracy, and to what degree the legal code should be influenced by Sharia law (Grami 
2014, 391-392). Despite Tunisia’s history of secularism, public interest in radical Islam grew 
quickly, and these groups were quick to engage in mobilising structures. Many of these 
radical Islamic leaders had been freed by the interim government’s general amnesty law such 
as the Salafist organisation – Ansar al-Sharia, to establish themselves in the public eye as 
religious authorities (Balboni and Malka 2016). The “weakness of the state in terms of 
repressive capacity” and “the resulting power vacuum”, in this case religious, explains how 
radical Islamic social movements were able to establish “safe havens for training and 
socialization into violence” (Della Porta 2013, 56)  
Post-Revolutionary Mobilising Structures 
 The post-revolutionary religious vacuum and political opportunity structure are some 
of the key reasons radical Islamic social movements were able to act as mobilising structures 
promoting transnational political violence. Ennahda led the post-revolutionary interim 
government. The political party’s own repression under the authoritarian regime, and its 
support base ranging from Sufis to Salafis, provided it with an understanding of the relational 
characteristics of repression of radical Islamic social movements under the authoritarian 
regime. This resulted in the party not wanting to follow in the footsteps of the authoritarian 
Isabella Vogel  
Master Thesis  
6th June 2017 
	
21 
	 	 	
regime, and therefore different Islamic practises and radical Islamic social movements were 
tolerated (Balboni and Malka 2016). The post-revolutionary political and religious openness 
allowed Tunisians to engage in discussions with friends and attend mosques without fearing 
persecution or imprisonment (Member of Ansar al-Sharia). The political and religious 
freedom espoused by the interim government gave rise to new religious “discourses, new 
practices”, “religious nursery schools, [and] Qu’ranic associations” and an “explosion of 
religious book sales”. As interests in radical Islamic preaching increased, “religious satellite 
channels” out of “Egypt, Bahrain, Kuwait [and] Saudi Arabia” and the internet provided 
individuals direct access (Grami 2014, 392-393). The most prominent radical Islamic social 
movements was Ansar al-Sharia. 12. Ansar al-Sharia utilised the post-revolutionary political 
opportunity structure to engage in mobilising structures, developing “an avid youth base in 
working-class and low-income neighbourhoods through grass root outreach, charitable 
activities, and proselytization campaigns” (Balboni and Malka 2016). The post-revolutionary 
religious vacuum gave radical Islamic social movements the opportunity to establish and take-
over mosques as well, controlling “400 of Tunisia’s roughly 5000 mosques”, with violent 
radical Islamic social movements controlling 50 of those 400 (Balboni and Malka). Thus, the 
post-revolutionary political opportunity structures and the existence of a religious vacuum 
allowed radical Islamic social movements to create mobilising structures by occupying 
religious institutions and their grass root outreach.   
 
Framing of Tunisia as the Land of Da’wa  
																																								 																				
12	The movement’s origins lay with Tunisian foreign-fighters who had been active in Afghanistan and Bosnia, 
and had engaged in radical Islamic transnational networks, primarily Al-Qaeda. Ansar al-Sharia is a splinter 
group of Al-Qaeda  in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which was set up by a transnational network of Tunisian, 
Algerian and Libyan extremist (Zelin 2015).	
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 The framing of Tunisia as a land of preaching, or da’wa, explains in a great part the 
activation of foreign-fighter networks.  The radical Islamic social movement Ansar al-Sharia 
framed Tunisia as a land of da’wa (Islamic preaching)13, and did not encourage the activation 
of militant networks domestically, however, they did encourage the activation of transnational 
militant networks by promoting engaging jihad on foreign soil, such as in Syria (Balboni  and 
Malka 2016). Initially, post-revolution, the Ennahda party did not take a firm stance on the 
mobilisation of Tunisian foreign-fighters, and the Minister of Religious Affairs Noureddine 
Khademi, allegedly “actively endorsed the Syrian jihad before he took office in December 
2011, speaking of a duty to “support our Syrian brothers” suffering under the repression of the 
Assad regime” (Balboni and Malka 2016; Legal Scholar 2017). Furthermore, the post-
revolutionary freedom of movement (between 2011-2013) facilitated the departure of foreign-
fighters from Tunisia, as Tunisians were able to travel to both Libya and Turkey without 
visas, and the border regions smuggling routes provided an entrance root via Libya for 
weapons (Balboni and Malka 2016).  This political environment and the continuation of the 
civil war in Syria and Libya, provided a platform for the radical Islamic social movements to 
build on their own transnational networks, including links to Al-Qaeda and IS (Balboni and 
Malka 2016). Simultaneously they encouraged individuals to join the fight against what were 
framed as illegitimate regimes, particularly Assad’s regime, rather than become domestically 
politically violent.  
Shifts in the Political Opportunity Structures  
The post-revolutionary government’s rejection of Sharia law and the return of radical 
Islamic social movements to their repertoires of protest in part explains the return of pre-
																																								 																				
13 Abu Iyad, the leader of Ansar al-Sharia, affiliated to Al-Qaeda, in Tunisia repeatedly officially said that 
Tunisia is the land of da’wa and not jihad. The group actively encouraged Tunisians to join the jihad against 
Assad in Syria (Gartenstein-Ross 2013, 17)	
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revolutionary counter-terrorism policies. Despite radical Islamic social movements framing 
Tunisia as a land of da’wa, they did not agree with the state’s secularist policies. From 2012 
onwards, acts of political violence targeting both Tunisians and foreigners brought change to 
the post-revolutionary political opportunity structure. As Della Porta (2013) identifies, “young 
democracies tend to fear political protest” and often attempt to counter political protest by 
returning to authoritarian policies (37). The escalation of Ansar al-Sharia’s acts of political 
violence witnessed Tunisia’s young democracy countering these threats by returning to the 
authoritarian regime’s repertoires of state-repression. The corresponding assent of the Nida 
Tounes party also signalled a reintroduction of the political and socioeconomic outlook of the 
authoritarian regime, as the political party included individuals who had been in positions of 
power during the Ben Ali regime (El Kadhi 2017). These changes in Tunisia’s post-
revolutionary political opportunity structure resulted in the government framing political 
violence and foreign-fighters as the primary threat to Tunisia’s democracy, overshadowing 
the socioeconomic grievances of the revolution. This political opportunity shift included 
Ansar al-Sharia being “labelled a terrorist organisation in 2013” and the return of the state-
control of Islamic practises14 (Gartenstein-Ross 2013, 2; Balboni and Malka 2016; Fahmi and 
Meddeb 2015). The 2015 counter-terrorism law, which resembles the 2003 counter-terrorism 
act, gave “security forces broad powers to arrest and detain suspects”, such as foreign-fighters 
or individual’s suspected of having been or desiring to leave to be foreign-fighters, and was 
“extraordinarily broad, vague and imprecise” (Balboni and Malka 2016; Legal Scholar 2017).  
The law “impose[d] arbitrary restrictions on liberty and freedom of movement” and allowed 
																																								 																				
14 Firstly in 2014 the post-revolutionary constitution of 2014 “reinforced the government’s mandate as the 
‘guardian of religion’” in an attempt by the state to gain control of mosques which had becomes strongholds of 
radical Islamic social movements, such as Ansar al-Sharia (Balboni and Malka 2016). In 2015, the Tunisian 
minister “of religious affairs, Othman Batikh” had set out to “enforce the law” and “put all mosques and imams 
under the ministry’s control”, mimicking Ben Ali’s religious control model to some extent (Fahmi and Meddeb 
2015, 11).   
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the state to “detain…suspects arrested for terrorism-related offences for up to 15 days…deny 
[suspects] access to a lawyer for 48 hours, and interrogate them without the presence of their 
lawyer” (Amnesty International 2017, 364-365). The Tunisian security forces have also been 
accused of returning to their pre-revolutionary repertories of action, with reports of “torture 
and ill-treatment” emerging (Amnesty International 2017, 364-365). The relational 
characteristics of the interactions between security forces and individuals showed similar 
patterns to those of the authoritarian regime. Attending the same mosque as a person of 
interest could render an individual being labelled “potentially extremist”, and family members 
of suspects have been subjected to “repressive measures, including house raids and DNA 
samples being taken” (Legal Scholar 2017). However, despite the apparent return to 
authoritarian policies, steps continued to be taken to institutionalise democracy. A number of 
institutions were created to tackle the grievances of the revolution’s protests, such as the 
Ministry of Governance and the Authority for Good Governance and Fight against 
Corruption, as well the Transitional Justice and Dignity Commission. However, countering 
the ‘extremists Islamist’ threat remained the top priority for the current government and the 
current state of emergency (OECD 2016; Legal Scholar 2017).  The combination of the shift 
in the political opportunity structure and the escalation of radical Islamic social movements’ 
acts of political violence resulted in the government framing radical Islamic social movements 
in a similar vein to the authoritarian regime, and employing similar counter-terrorism 
mechanisms.   
 
Persistence of the Grievances of the Revolution and Foreign-Fighters 
 The political culture of corruption in Tunisia has strongly contributed to the 
persistence of the revolution’s socioeconomic grievances and perceived economic 
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deprivation. Politically, an internal battle between the post-revolutionary government and 
civil servants, as well as the Ministry of Interior emerged (Van Deventer 2017). Tunisia’s 
civil servants, Ministry of Interior and security forces have been accused of adhering to their 
pre-revolutionary social and cultural practices of repression and corruption (Singleton 2017). 
The nation’s elite, with the exception of the Ben Ali family, has witnessed little direct change, 
with the country’s economy continuing to be ruled by an “oligarchy” (El Kadhi 2017). 
Corruption has cost the country approximately “two percent of GDP per year, approximately 
US$1.2 billion per annum” (The World Bank 2014, 10-11). This equated to $110 having been 
“lost per person per year in the unrecorded transfers of illegal capital” (Global Financial 
Integrity 2011 quoted in The World Bank 2014, 10-11). The assets of the Ben Ali clan 
amounted to US$13 billion, equating to “more than one quarter of [the] Tunisian GDP in 
2011” (The World Bank 2014, 10-11). While Transparency International’s 2016 report on 
Tunisia argued that progress had been made in terms of the prosecution of corrupt officials, 
more needs to be done to fully ensure the culpability of corrupt Tunisian officials (Everett 
2016). The persistence of Tunisia’s oligarchy and political corruption have contributed to 
limiting the experiential reality of post-revolutionary change, particularly in relation to the 
persistence of socioeconomic inequality.  
The combination of “repression and concessions” exercised by the post-revolutionary 
Tunisian government, led to a decline in the “intensity” of “mass protest”, however, it has 
provided radical Islamic social movements with the mobilising structures to successfully 
recruit and engage in clandestine political violence (Della Porta 2013). An example being that 
78.4% of the Tunisians questioned across the 24 governates supported the government’s state 
of emergency implemented in 2015 as a response to the increased terrorist threats; 
furthermore, 72% supported the state-control of mosques, according to the Tunisian 
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consulting company Emrhod15. Another report from Elka Consulting16, claimed that 47.2% of 
Tunisians believed terrorism was the nation’s largest issue, whilst 15.9% believed 
unemployment was17. Whilst these surveys indicated that the general public believed there 
was a necessity for the new counter-terrorism measures, and accepted the return of state-
control of Islam; the role of the current government in promulgating its framing of the 
foreign-fighter question should not be ignored  in the discussion of “repression and 
concessions” (Legal Scholar 2017). The current government framed foreign-fighters as a 
potential threat to post-revolutionary Tunisian society, and oppressed their mobilising 
structures in place of addressing their grievances (Balboni and Malka 2016; Legal Scholar 
2017). Radical Islamic social movements, such as Ansar al-Sharia and more recently Okb ibn 
Nafaa18 framed themselves in opposition to the state. They have offered aid to “those in 
need”, and took “advantage of the loosening of security in poor areas by engaging in 
vigilantism, social mediation, and conflict resolution”, thus framing themselves as an 
alternative to the state (Fahmi and Meddeb 2015, 5).  
These movements provided an alternative experiential reality for individuals whose 
socioeconomic disgruntlements were not addressed by the post-revolutionary government 
(Fahmi and Meddeb 2015, 8). Recent studies exposed that in the rural regions of Sidi Bouzid 
and Kasserine, “62% of young graduates believed their socioeconomic situation” was worse 
than that of “their parents”.  The disgruntlement towards the revolution was felt amongst the 
youth in the suburbs of Tunis as well, as some “90% estimate that their situation has not 
																																								 																				
15	http://archivev2.mosaiquefm.net/fr/index/a/ActuDetail/Element/54853-emrhod-78-4-des-tunisiens-
approuvent-la-proclamation-de-l-etat-d-urgence-en-tunisie  
16 https://www.tunisienumerique.com/tunisie-priorite-a-la-lutte-contre-le-terrorisme-pour-472-des-
tunisiens/263407  
17 Both consultancy groups were quoted by Foreign Policy: http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/08/18/tunisias-new-
anti-terrorism-law-worries-activists-tunisia/  
18	It is a violent radical Islamic social movement that was initially linked to al-Qaeda and now to IS, often 
operating out of Libya (Balboni and Malka 2016).	
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changed, and 46% consider it even worse than it was under Ben Ali’s regime” (Fahmi and 
Meddeb 2015, 9). Part and parcel of this continued to be that the job-market mainly consisted 
of individuals without a high-school diploma (estimated 85%), whilst for the estimated 
140,000 university graduates only 60,000-65,000 “new jobs” were on offer (Fahmi and 
Meddeb 2015, 9). This created a situation where “those with university qualifications [were] 
actually at higher risk of remaining jobless or working in a job that [did] not correspond with 
their qualifications”, a clear example of Gurr’s relative deprivation theory (Fahmi and 
Meddeb 2015, 9). 33% of Tunisia’s 15-29 years olds were neither in education, employment, 
nor training of any sorts. This lack of activity amongst young Tunisians did not mean that 
Salafism and becoming a foreign fighter was their first alternative, “however, the perception 
that they [did] not deserve their low status [fuelled] societal fractures and [invited] violence”, 
and extremist Islamic social movements provided a platform to express this frustration (Fahmi 
and Meddeb 2015, 10). As relative deprivation theory explains, perceived inequality and 
injustices, in this case being the continuation of a culture of corruption, can lead to individuals 
turning to political violence within a democracy. Additionally, Tunisia’s border region’s 
history of illicit trade, and post-revolutionary anarchy allowed radical Islamic social 
movements to circumvent the return of state’s escalated policing policies by shifting certain 
mobilisation structures to Libya and moving underground (Balboni and Malka 2016; Meddeb 
2017). IS in itself, the conflict in Syria and the destabilisation of Libya provided individuals 
with an alternative to their lives in Tunisia and a route to engage in political violence. IS 
provided “a narrative that allow[ed] rebels without a cause to connect with a cause” (Olivier 
Roy quoted by Meddeb 2017, 14). Radical Islamic social movements, such as IS, were able to 
recruit new members through highlighting the socio-economic “injustices” these individuals 
faced, such as the recent “heightened security clampdowns” in the border regions 
(International Crisis Group 2013, 6). The conflict abroad was framed as “alternative to the 
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‘illegitimate’ national state”, thus encouraging individuals seeking an alternative to their 
experiential realities to become foreign-fighters (Meddeb 2017, 14). The post-revolutionary 
government’s concessions, apparent political freedom coupled with repression, and the lack of 
socioeconomic change provided radical Islamic social movements with the (initial) political 
opportunity and mobilising structures to gain a wider audience; and framed becoming a 
“foreign-fighter” as an alternative to post-revolutionary Tunisia. 
Conclusion 
This thesis found that answering Tunisia’s foreign-fighter question requires looking 
beyond the democratisation of the nation. The country’s history of state-repression and 
religious policing, as well as the post-revolutionary political opportunity structure need to be 
taken into consideration. Furthermore, the mobilising structures employed by radical Islamic 
social movements and the persistence of socioeconomic inequalities must also be considered, 
as ignoring these factors would limit understanding of current foreign-fighter phenomenon to 
the political context. Tunisia’s history of political and religious state-repression explains the 
relational characteristic of the current wave of political violence. The history of state-
repression contributed to Islamic social movements gaining legitimacy as opposition to the 
authoritarian state, and initially occupying the post-revolutionary political and religious 
institutions. This occurred concurrently to the civil war in Syria, and resulted in the post-
revolution political and religious institutions framing Assad as the enemy and encouraging 
individuals to join the war against the Syrian regime (Balboni and Malka 2016). The post-
revolutionary shift in Tunisia’s political opportunity structures, coupled with Tunisia being 
recognised as a land of da’wa, enabled radical Islamic social movements to mobilise foreign-
fighters through their occupation of religious institutions and growth in popularity 
(Gartenstein-Ross 2013; Balboni and Malka 2016). Whilst the post-revolutionary freedoms 
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witnessed a spread of radical Islamic social movements, their disagreement with the post-
revolutionary government’s course of actions, including its commitment to secularism, led to 
the activation of militant networks and acts of political violence. These in turn were met with 
a return to the pre-revolutionary policies of state-repression as a means of countering the 
threat of political violence. The continuation of the territorial centralisation of political and 
economic power further fuelled post-revolutionary tensions, especially the border area and 
interior regions, which were highly reliant on illicit economic activity and smuggling roots, 
witnessed security-crackdowns. These acts highlighted the emergent characteristics of 
political violence. Whilst the return to pre-revolutionary relational characteristics of counter-
terrorism policies explains the shift of the mobilising structures of radical Islamic social 
movements from Tunisia to Libya, and the perceived injustice in the treatment of the interior 
regions; the persistence of the socioeconomic grievances, specifically of Tunisian educated 
youth, to great part explains the perceived relative deprivation and constructivist 
characteristics of the foreign-fighter question.  Radical Islamic social movements were to a 
certain extent successful in establishing themselves in areas where the state was framed as 
having failed to bring socioeconomic change to the population. This framework of perceived 
injustices facilitated in portraying the conflict in Syria, and Libya, as an “alternative to the 
‘illegitimate’ national state” (Meddeb 2017, 14). The case of Tunisia’s post-revolutionary 
foreign-fighters illustrates that analysing multiple factors, including political opportunity and 
mobilising structures is required to understand how radical Islamic social movements framed 
foreign conflict, and what motivated so many Tunisians to become foreign-fighters.    
 The foreign-fighter question cannot be limited to a discussion of solely the nation’s 
historical repression of Islam, democratisations, the grievances of the 2011 revolution’s 
protest cycle, or post-revolutionary political opportunity and mobilising structures. Both the 
structure and the agency behind foreign-fighters must be taken into consideration to 
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understand their motivating factors. Furthermore, drawing on Della Porta’s (2013) 
framework, this thesis did not consider foreign-fighters an isolated phenomenon but analysed 
the relational, constructivist, and emergent characteristics that contributed to the rise in 
numbers of Tunisian foreign-fighters. Equally, this thesis has attempted not to essentialise the 
Islamic component of Tunisia’s foreign-fighters, in order to discuss foreign-fighters in a non-
religiously specific social movement framework. As Singleton (2017) highlighted, “nobody 
really knows” why Tunisia in particular has so many foreign-fighters. However, analysing the 
different political, social and economic factors that contributed to the 2011 revolution, assist 
in understanding what factors have motivated individuals to become foreign-fighters. “It is 
unwise to make generalisations about the motivations” of Tunisian foreign-fighters, as 
“[r]eligion, economic opportunity, and even [the] government’s own actions or inactions may 
influence[d] an individual’s choice to travel to Syria and become involved in that conflict” (El 
Jamali and Vinatier 2015, 3). There is no one reason, or generalisation that can be made on 
Tunisian foreign-fighters. The individual motivations and socioeconomic of foreign-fighter 
backgrounds may differ greatly. However, contextualising Tunisia’s social, political, and 
economic realities contribute to gaining an understanding of the motivations of post-
revolutionary Tunisian foreign-fighters.  
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